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JAMES A. MARTIN 
Paul D. Carrington* 
Jim Martin was a natural. From the day he first took his seat in 
August 1966 on the second row of the corner classroom in Hutchins 
Hall, he had an instinctive perception of his role as a lawyer, which, so 
far as I know, he never changed. 
While he was quite capable of speculation about other ways of do-
ing things, his mind readily accepted and even welcomed legal texts 
and traditions as the parameters within which serious work was to 
proceed. To him who had trained in mathematics, it was congenial to 
isolate a legal problem from much of its context in order to achieve a 
clearer focus on the import of the constraints of law. I am in danger 
here of describing Jim as one of T. R. Powell's famous lawyers: one 
who can think of something that is inextricably related to something 
else without thinking about the something else. Jim could, indeed, 
think that way as effectively as mo.st, but he always, or so I believe, 
knew what he was doing in that regard. His was, I perceived, a moral 
position, that judges ought to strive to hear and obey the law's com-
mand even when it produces results that are personally distasteful to 
the persons applying the lash of power. He held that overcontextual-
ization can obstruct performance of this moral obligation by rational-
izing the self-indulgent instincts of judges, and thereby impair the 
moral integrity of law. · 
Our differences in respect to this matter emerged during the sum-
mer of 1967, when I was fortunate to have Jim's services as a research 
assistant. We worked on another project for most of the summer, but 
when I left for a family vacation in July, I gave him my conception of 
an article on which I hoped to commence work on my return. When I 
returned a month later, Jim had a first draft of Substantive Interests 
and the Jurisdiction of State Courts. 1 His was an extraordinary 
achievement in bringing my crude notion to life, and we published the 
article as co-authors. 
I was aware, however, that Jim had from the first some misgivings 
about the article, and I was not surprised when he told me in 1980 that 
he thought our conclusion to be wrong. His view was to a degree 
validated in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine2 and Calder v. Jones. 3 In the 
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latter of these companion cases, our article was unsuccessfully cited by 
the defendant. 
The thesis of our article, briefly stated, was that the fourteenth 
amendment may tolerate a longer jurisdictional reach in some classes 
of cases than others according to the nature of the substantive interests 
being asserted by the parties. Our primary example, perhaps, was a 
defamation case brought in Alabama state courts against a New York 
publisher of an account of events occurring in the civil rights struggle 
in Alabama. We urged that the courts are justified in recognizing the 
special threat to first amendment values posed by the extension of 
long-arm jurisdiction to sustain thinly disguised punitive proceedings 
based on "contacts" perhaps barely adequate to justify jurisdiction in a 
personal injury products liability case; we approved a holding that 
those sometime sufficient contacts may be insufficient in a political def-
amation case. 
It is not my purpose here to concede or to argue our difference, 
and certainly not to criticize the outcome in the two 1984 cases, which 
are distinguishable. Rather I wish to explain and to salute Jim's view, 
which I associate with the concern for the moral integrity of the law 
manifested in almost all the conversations I ever had with Jim about 
Civil Procedure. His later view had been expressed at the time of our 
writing by a student editor of the Columbia Law Review, who de-
scribed our position as a "tampering with due process." His was not 
merely a concern for the untidiness of mixing substance and proce-
dure, but, far more important, a perception that the judge practicing 
our suggested method of weighing substantive policy as a factor mea-
suring the length of the long arm would abandon, or at least weaken, 
his fidelity to the esteemed neutrality of legal principles. Jim Martin 
had no fear of subtlety or complexity so long as they helped the judge 
to comprehend and obey, with a minimum of manipulation to fit his 
own preferences of outcome. Our article was, he feared, an invitation 
to manipulation by courts who would tailor the length of long-arm 
jurisdiction to suit their own political preferences, whatever those 
might at the moment be. Thus it was, and perhaps others should 
know, that the mature Jim Martin dissented from the article signed by 
the youthful Jim Martin when overborne by his mentor, me. 
While I remain unshaken in my own former view, I have come 
greatly to value the moral source of my numerous adversaries' reluc-
tance to acknowledge what is to me a manifest truth. Of course, Jim 
was right that the moral duty of the judge to subordinate her prefer-
ences to the texts and the traditions of the law is a duty of paramount 
importance, and not too much can be said to reinforce the community 
of shared perceptions of lawyers and judges which make such moral 
conduct of judges rewarding to themselves. In former times, we have 
allowed or encouraged judges to hide behind that moral duty, to the 
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neglect of other duties to reconcile law with emerging moral stan-
dards. But surely in these times, the risk is otherwise. Our profes-
sional world is full of precepts and examples which not only observe 
and predict, but even encourage judges to neglect their duty to 
subordinate themselves to the texts and traditions, to the reasoned ex-
pectations of others, which are the law. In such a world, Jim Martin 
had a very special and very important role to play, a special burden to 
bear. His students needed his example of a man who nurtured a 
strong belief that legal texts and traditions should and do guide judi-
cial conduct. And our professional world needed alumni who harbor 
belief in that possibility. 
For this reason, among others, Jim's premature death was a sub-
stantial loss to the law. The loss is ineffable, but no less certain on that 
account. Because those who come later cannot hope to perceive this 
kind of loss, I am grateful for this opportunity to take its notice. I 
pray for Jim and for us that some of his students will pick up his 
burden where he left it and will continue ·on the path he took. 
